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Theories of Gold Price Movements: Common Wisdom or Myths?
Abstract
This paper examines several of the explanations commonly provided regarding gold and its price movements.
We consider the safe haven, inflation hedge, and dollar destruction hypotheses. The results are mixed. Our
data does not support the theories that gold is a safe haven or an inflation hedge. We find that gold is a zero-
beta asset and there is a strong negative correlation between gold and the value of the US dollar in the post
Bretton-Woods era. The decomposition of gold prices under a semi-structural model finds the aggregate
demand shock, monetary policy shock, and precautionary demand shock of gold all only have modest
influence on the price movement of gold.
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1. Introduction 
Gold has a unique status in the economic world: a precious medal with wide 
uses, a store of wealth, and for a long time, the measure of economic power of 
nations and the cornerstone of international monetary regimes. In recent years, the 
world witnessed an aggressive growth in gold price. The role of gold in 
investment has drawn more attention since this transformational economic crisis 
began to unfold in 2008. This paper is another attempt to disentangle the price 
movement of gold after the Bretton-Woods system, the last international 
monetary regime based on gold. To what extents can we understand the price 
movement of gold? Can we find support for some popular opinions about gold on 
finance media? For instance: is gold a safe haven, a negative-beta asset, or an 
inflation hedge? How should we think about gold: a commodity or a currency? 
This paper provides some thoughts on these questions.  
 
1.1 Gold and the Gold Standard  
Returning to gold standard has never been seriously discussed for decades. 
After waves of gold reserves sales in the last fifteen years or so, gold is being  
seen more and more as a common commodity. But history has a long shade in 
economic thinking and economic activities; one cannot fully understand the 
current status of gold and its price fluctuations while totally disregarding its 
history. 
Gold has been used in rituals, decorations, and jewelry for thousands of years. 
Its unusual chemical properties—high density, superb malleability, imperishable 
shine—and its genuine rarity all contribute to it being the most coveted 
commodity in nearly every culture. But it is not until in the late nineteenth century 
when the gold standard formed that gold went onto the central stage of global 
economic life. In that half a century, on one hand there was a huge supply shock 
of gold as a result of the Gold Rushes; on the other hand there was soaring 
demand for a global monetary medium of high value to finance the rapid 
industrialization and the emerging international trade and banking. And the fact 
that Britain, the indisputable super power then, had adopted the gold standard and 
a series of historical incidents led all major economies save China signed up to 
gold by 1900.  
The gold standard, under which gold coins and fiat money could be converted 
at banks freely at a pre-set official rate and nations settled balance differences in 
gold, has intrinsic deflationary pressure: the inelastic supply of gold always made 
the money supply insufficient in a growing economy with rising productivity 
(insufficient liquidity). To keep up with demand for money, monetary authorities 
developed the “gold-exchange standard”: bank notes of major economies could 
also be treated as reserve assets. But the faith in the convertibility of foreign 
reserves (ultimately the commitment of monetary policy of reserve-currency 
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 countries) was always fragile. The huge global deflation after the collapse of 
foreign reserves under the interwar gold-exchange standard and the “neighbor thy 
beggar” policies largely caused the Great Depression.  
After the Great Depression and WWII, a new international monetary system, 
the Bretton-Woods system was founded. The implemented Bretton-Woods 
system1 was a fix-exchange-rate gold-dollar standard regime. Under it, the U.S. 
monetary authority was immediately put into a dilemma: with the U.S. being the 
sole de-facto reserve-currency country, whichever policy the Fed 
implemented—expansionary or tight money, it would lead to either the erosion of 
confidence on the dollar or a deflationary pressure worldwide. Also, domestic 
policy goals, such as maintaining economic growth and low employment, and the 
responsibility of reserve-currency country to stabilize the value of the dollar were 
often conflicting. These problems worsened in 1960s with the increasing 
expenditure on social welfare programs and the war in Vietnam. Pressure from 
foreign governments and speculators on financial markets and U.S. government 
pushed Bretton-Woods System to an end in 1973.  
Since 1973, gold could be publicly traded with little government 
intervention.2 It is no longer directly linked to any nation’s monetary policy or 
the value to any currency. The central banks continued to hold considerable 
amount of gold reserves for strategic or confidence reasons. There have been 
debates in academia on the better use of the former monetary gold.3 Since 1990s, 
Bank of England, Swiss National Bank and central banks of Eastern Bloc 
countries have sold great amount of their gold reserves.  
 
1.2 Gold Demand 
Gold has both private demands and government demands. As previously 
discussed, in the gold-standard era, government demand is monetary gold. In post 
Bretton-Woods era, central banks still hold great amount of gold reserves as 
strategic assets (“war chest”) but the government demands are not that active and 
influential as they were in gold-standard years.4 Private demands can be further 
                                                 
1
 The implemented Bretton-Woods system is pretty different from the designs. See the book “A 
Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System” for reference.  
2
 This is only the case in the West. In all Communist countries, private possession and trading of 
gold bars or coins were prohibited. These policies ended in the Eastern Bloc countries and the 
former Soviet Union countries in early 1990s. But in countries like China or North Korea, the state 
still holds tight control over gold production and private possession of gold.  
3
 For instance, see the paper “The benefits of expediting government gold sales” by Henderson 
and Salant et al.  
4
 Most governments don’t increase their holds for gold. Many countries began to their gold 
reserves. On the whole, government demands have been negative (in other words, net supply) for 
at least a decade. Only few countries, like Russia and China, are increasing their gold reserves in 
recent years.  
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 divided using different criteria. One division is investment (ETFs, bullions, bars 
etc.) and non-investment (jewelry, industrial and dental) demands. Another 
division is depletive uses (manufacturing and dentistry) and non-depletive uses 
(bullions, jewelry, ornamentation and hoarding etc.).  
What are the shares of different gold demands? We couldn’t find any data for 
the gold-standard era. But there have been estimates that between half and 
two-thirds of the annual production went to private uses.5 One snapshot of recent 
years’ gold demand breakup came from 2007. 6 In that year, the gold reserves of 
central banks and international institutions (IMF, for instance, is a large holder of 
gold reserves) decreased by 504.8 tons, which meant a negative demand or a net 
supply. All newly mined gold went to private sector: More than two thirds of it 
(2398.7 out of 3558.3 tons) went to jewelry, the industrial and dental demands 
used up approximately 13% of the production. The remaining fed private 
investment needs. Geographically, India consumed 773.6 tons of gold, about 20% 
of the world’s production; greater China region consumed 363.3 tons, ranking the 
second. In terms of “stock”, a rough estimate is that the total above-ground stocks 
of gold are about 161,000 tons7 now, 51% of which are in terms of jewelry. 
Official sectors hold nearly 30000 tons (18%), (private) investment 16%, and 
industrial 12%. 
 
1.3 Gold Supply 
Gold supply comes from mining, sales of gold reserves, and “old gold scrap” 
(the recycling of gold). The gold mining went hand in hand with the geographical 
discovery of the earth by mankind. During the Gold Rushes years (from 1850 to 
1900), about twice as much gold was mined as in previous history. The annual 
production of gold continued to increase dramatically in the twentieth century: 
from less than 500 tons per year in the 1900s all the way to more than 2000 tons 
per year in late 1980s. In the last fifteen years though, the annual mining 
production fluctuated around 2500 tons,8 which revealed the increasing difficulty 
of finding new deposits and mining and extraction in non-rich sites. Most of the 
gold left to be mined exists as traces buried in marginal areas of the globe, for 
instance, in the rain forests of Indonesia, the Andes and on the Tibetan plateau of 
China. Gold mining has been bringing environmental disasters in forms of 
mercury linkage, deforestation and waste rocks among others to Africa, Latin 
America and East and Southeast Asia. This has drawn more and more attention 
                                                 
5
 The discussion is in Barsky and Summers (1988). 
6
 The 2007 demand data is from World Gold Council website. 
7
 Whether this figure means the amount of gold have been mined in all human history or only 
those that are available to this generation is unclear.  
8
 The sources of data for the gold worksheet are the mineral statistics publications of the U.S. 
Bureau of Mines (USBM) and the U.S.Geological Survey (USGS)—Minerals Yearbook (MYB).  
3
Fei and Adibe: Gold Price Theories: Common Wisdom or Myths?
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2010
 worldwide.  
 
1.4 Gold Price Movements 
We chose the perspective of testing some commonly-held or heatedly-debated 
opinions about the price of gold as a means to analyze its price movement. 
Several common-wisdom “theories” are considered: 
Firstly, people claim that as gold remains the eternal symbol of wealth in 
people’s minds; people will switch their investments to gold in ages of turbulence. 
Gold is the “safe haven” on the financial market. To test this hypothesis, we look 
into various “fear” measures: volatility in the stock market, consumer 
expectations of the future, and bond risk premiums (the difference in yield 
between Aaa and Baa bonds) and check the correlations of those and gold price 
movements. A somewhat related hypothesis—the negative-beta asset hypothesis 
(“gold goes up when everything else going down”) is also tested.  
Secondly, people marketing gold investment products will always describe 
gold as an “inflation hedge”. A straightforward analysis is provided on the real 
gold price (level), the return of gold and expected and actual inflation to test this 
claim.  
Instead of viewing gold as a special asset, we suggest the data suggest it is 
more reasonable that we view gold as another currency, whose value is a 
reflection of the value of U.S. dollar. We investigate extensively on the 
relationship between gold price and dollar and dollar-valued assets in section 5.  
Some other less theoretical sayings are considered too, for example the effect 
of surging demands in India and China and the central bank gold reserve sales on 
the gold price.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
data used in this study. The next three parts discuss three hypotheses one by one: 
section 3 focuses on safe haven hypothesis and whether gold behaves as a 
negative beta asset, section 4 is on inflation hedge hypothesis, and section 5 
investigates the relationship between gold price and U.S. dollar. Section 6 reports 
results from multiple linear regressions. A semi-structural VAR model is 
constructed and analyzed in section 7 before we conclude. 
 
2. Data 
Our data includes real gold price, various “fear” indicators, U.S. inflation rate, 
real long-term interest rate, indicators of real economic activity and the exchange 
rate. For gold price, we used the closing price on the last trading day for gold each 
month on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The data series ranges from 
January 1956 to October 2008 and is available on the Commodity Research Board 
(CRB) website. The figures are in 2008 dollars. Overall, gold prices appear to 
have been in a downward trend since the peak in the early 1980s but showed an 
4
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 impressive upward movement in recent five to ten years, as shown in Figure 1. A 
simple serial correlation test showed the monthly gold price is highly serial 
correlated. Figure 2 shows the trend of monthly gold returns, or month-to-month 
gold price changes, in percentage. It is not serially correlated but quite noisy.  
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Figure 1: Real Gold Price 1978-2008
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Figure 2: Monthly Gold Returns 1978-2008
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We considered three “fear” indicators for this study. The first one is the stock 
market volatility; in this case the squared monthly returns of the S&P 500 Index 
suggested by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1988). The second is the University 
of Michigan Index of Consumer Expectations, which represents sentiment of the 
general public about the economy in the near future. Higher scores represent 
optimism and lower scores represent pessimism.9 The index is by construction 
stable. The last one is a bond premium: the difference in yields between Moody 
rated Aaa and Baa seasoned corporate bond. This widening of the premium is an 
indicator of growing uneasiness on the market. 
The actual inflation measure is just the monthly change of the Consumer 
Price Index (urban, all goods). The expected inflation measure comes from the 
University of Michigan/Reuters Survey of Consumers, in which they reported the 
median price change the consumers expected over the next twelve months.  
We have two measures regarding the value of dollar. The first one is the 
exchange rate, to be specific, the Trade Weighted Exchange Index provided by St. 
Louis Fed. The index is de facto the exchange rate of U.S. dollar against a basket 
of currencies, which includes currencies from the Euro Area, Canada, Japan, 
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and Sweden. High values for the index 
mean a relatively strong dollar, and low values for the index mean a weak dollar. 
The second one is the value of dollar-backed assets, in this case the real ten-year 
Treasury bond rate.  
We consider three macroeconomic activity measures: monthly return of the 
S&P 500 Index, U.S. industrial production (detrended) and the cargo freight rate 
index used in Kilian (2007).  
Our sample period is from January 1978 to December 2007. We used 
monthly data.10  
 
3. Safe Haven Hypothesis and Gold as a Negative-Beta Asset 
People often associate gold with the notion of a safe haven. We define safe 
haven assets to be assets that people would like to invest in when uncertainty and 
fear increases. These assets would preserve their values in times of turmoil or 
recession. So we investigate the overall relationship between return on gold and 
various fear measures mentioned above to testify this hypothesis. If this 
                                                 
9
 This index is based on the relative scores (the percent giving favorable replies minus the percent 
giving unfavorable replies plus 100) of each of the five survey questions. Higher scores represent 
optimism and lower scores represent pessimism. The indices are monthly published by Reuters 
and Survey Research Center of University of Michigan. 
10
 The monthly available series include: US Industrial Production Index, U.S. CPI, Kilian Dry 
Cargo Freight Rate Index and University of Michigan Consumer Expectation Index. The Moody’s 
BAA and AAA seasoned corporate bond yields, Trade Weighted Exchange Index: Major 
Currencies, 10-year Treasury bond rate are averages of daily data.  
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 hypothesis is true, if people become more fearful in the markets, the price of gold 
should rise. The safe haven hypothesis is closely related to the negative-beta-asset 
hypothesis. We define negative-beta assets to be those whose returns are 
negatively correlated with macroeconomic performance, measured by monthly 
return of S&P 500, the dry cargo freight rate index introduced in Kilian (2007) 
and the U.S. industrial production in our study. First, we look at the “fear 
premium” side to the safe haven hypothesis.  
 
3.1 Gold and Volatility 
We started looking at the effect of volatility on the price of gold to test the 
safe haven hypothesis. Looking at Figure 3, a graph of the logged real price of 
gold and the constructed volatilty measure, the safe haven effect is not evident. 
Many of the most salient moves in the graph either provide evidence that is 
contrary to the idea of gold being a safe haven, or provide no evidence at all. 
From 1978 to 1980, the price of gold rises from $611 to $1897 (in 2008 dollars), 
while volatility falls from 37 to 33. The safe haven hypothesis does not require 
volatility is the only factor in gold price movements, and there is a lot of noise in 
the volatility data from month to month, but we would expect the overall mean of 
volatility to be elevated during a tripling of the gold price. Additionally, elevated 
levels of volatility such as 1998 to 2003 are accompanied by falling gold prices. 
One period where the fear premium seems to hold is from 1987-1988 where 
volatility is at its highest level ever in the sample period and the price of gold 
rises. The only caveat is the price of gold does not rise by as much as the fear 
premium hypothesis would lead us to expect. 
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Figure 3: Gold & Volatility
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 Regressing monthly real gold price on the constructed volatility measure 
yields an R-squared of only .0001 and a p-value of the beta coefficient .424. So it 
is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on the volatility measure at .289 
means a one percent rise in volatility leads to a monthly increase in the real gold 
price by 29 cents, which is economically insignificant. This confirms what the 
graph shows. Gold price and volatility are uncorrelated and changes in volatility 
do not seem to have any effect on the price of gold. 
One reasonable interpretation of this phenomenon is that market participants 
do not interpret volatility in the market as risk and thus see no reason to buy gold. 
Evidence of this is in the technology sector boom in the late 1990s where 
volatility rose to much higher levels but the gold price declined. The volatility 
increase in this period was a result of equities rising by large amounts day after 
day. If investors were afraid of anything, it was that they would wake up late and 
miss an opportunity for a huge return. 
Nonetheless, there are two spots in Figure 3 where volatility and gold prices 
move in tandem: 1987 and 2007, two periods of genuine stress in the markets. 
They suggest we look at alternative measures of fear to further investigate the fear 
premium hypothesis. 
 
3.2 Gold and Consumer Expectation  
Substituting the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Expectations 
(ICE) for the fear indicator leads to a similar result. For the “safe haven” 
hypothesis to hold here, gold should rise as the expected index falls. For 
comparison with the S&P 500 constructed volatility measure, ICE should be high 
when volatility is low. Graphically, the “safe haven” relationship looks stronger. 
During the 1990s as the expectations index was rising, the price of gold was 
falling, and then when ICE began to fall in 2000, gold began to rise. The same 
relationship held in the 1980 period with the large increase in the price of gold at 
the same time of a large decline in ICE.  
Simple linear regressions showed that one percent increase in the 
expectations index leads to a decrease in monthly gold return by $23.90. The 
R-squared from this model is .006; not much of the variation in monthly gold 
return is explained by consumer expectations. The p-value of .1307 also makes 
the coefficient statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, the sign is consistent with 
the theory; if consumers have low expectations of the economy and are thus 
fearful of the future, the price of gold should rise. 
We would expect consumer expectations to give an overall picture of longer 
term trends in the economy. This characteristic would make ICE less able to 
inform the return on gold prices for any given month. Using quarterly and 
bi-annually gold returns yields coefficients of -38.71 and -42.83, respectively. 
Both coefficients are statistically significant, and the R-squared increases as the 
8
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 frequency decreases. The interpretation is that declines in consumer confidence 
are more reliably indicative of increasing gold prices in the longer term.   
 
3.3 Gold and Bond Premium 
The bond premium we constructed is Moody’s Aaa Corporate Yield 
subtracted from Moody’s Baa Corporate Yield. In scarier times, Baa bonds are 
relatively more risky because lower rated companies become relatively more 
likely to default, thus investors require a greater premium over the Aaa yield. In 
1982 and 1983, the bond premium is rises significantly while the gold price falls. 
In 1991, there is a spike in the bond premium (perhaps related to the Savings and 
Loan crisis and or the declaration of the Persian Gulf War) but no similar spike in 
the gold price. The same thing happens again from 1998 to around 2002 as the 
bond premium jumps while the price of gold falls or stagnates. 
The safe heaven hypothesis fails here again: The regression result of a $7.13 
decrease in the monthly gold return for a one percent rise in the bond premium is 
economically insignificant and the p-value of .35 makes it statistically 
insignificant. Moreover, the sign contradicts the hypothesis. As the bond premium 
rises, the gold price should also be rising as should gold returns. The theory of 
buying gold in hopes of high returns during hard times in the market is defeated. 
We next turn to gold and its relationship over time to the market in general. 
 
3.4 Gold as a Negative Beta Asset 
We then turn to the negative-beta asset hypothesis. First, we look into S&P 
500. In 1981, gold appears to peak with the S&P 500. In 1983, they appear to 
bottom out together. In 1984, they again appear to peak together. This 
co-movement appears roughly throughout the sample period with the exception of 
1990-2003. These thirteen years are probably the foundation upon which the 
hypothesis that gold is a negative beta asset is based. The simple linear regression 
rejects the negative beta asset hypothesis. Regressing monthly gold return on the 
difference in the S&P 500 month to month yields a coefficient of .0221 with a 
p-value of .7382 (using the logarithm of the S&P 500 yields nearly identical 
results) and an R-squared of .0003. This means, not only does the S&P 500 
explain less than 1% of the variation in monthly gold return, but we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the coefficient for the S&P 500 is zero. McCown and 
Zimmerman (2006) get the same result over a slightly different sample period of 
1970 to 2003, stating that, “gold shows the characteristics of a zero-beta asset.” 
Zero-beta in this instance means gold does not follow or counter the S&P 500 at 
all, instead, it is uncorrelated.  
The second macroeconomic condition indicator is the index of U.S. Industrial 
Production. We regressed monthly gold returns on the difference in industrial 
production from one month to the next. The coefficient was -3.87 with a p-value 
9
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 of .4766. This is statistically insignificant and tells us the same thing as our 
analysis of gold and the S&P 500. Gold is not a negative beta asset. If anything, it 
is a zero-beta asset. 
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Figure 4: Zero-Beta Asset
 
Our last measure of macroeconomic performance is more global. It is the 
index of dry cargo freight rate” constructed in Kilian (2007). Cargo freight rates 
are a particularly good indicator of economic activity because the supply of ships 
is very sticky. If there is a demand surge due to increased economic activity, it 
takes a long time for new ships to be built to accommodate the new demand. 
Thus, in the short to medium term, there are large increases in shipping rates. 
These large increases leave room on the way down for huge plunges. This 
sensitivity makes shipping rates a good indicator of exactly what is going on in 
the world markets at a given period in time. Our data comes in the form of percent 
changes from one month to the next and 1978-1982 do not look promising for the 
negative-beta hypothesis. The only really convincing negative-beta movement is 
around 1990 to 2001 where cargo freight rates spiked for a little bit and the gold 
price bottomed. The regression of monthly gold returns on the cargo freight rate 
change yields a coefficient of .0818 and a p-value of .5533. Negative beta theory 
fails again. Figure 4 confirms gold is a zero-beta asset as the slope from the 
regression line for the scatter plot of monthly gold returns and cargo freight rate 
change is nearly zero. 
 
4. Gold as an Inflation Hedge 
10
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 Gold is also commonly believed to be a hedge against inflation. We define 
inflation as the general rise in the price level (rather than an increase in the money 
supply) and use changes in the Consumer Price Index as the measure of monthly 
inflation. To be a hedge against inflation as the idea is most commonly 
understood, gold would not only have to be uncorrelated with inflation, it would 
have to be negatively correlated.  
In 1978, Roy Jastram, a professor of business at Berkeley, wrote a book titled 
The Golden Constant that says since the 1560 gold has held its purchasing power 
in England and the United States. The theory also claims commodity prices move 
towards the gold price rather than the other way around. This thinking is in line 
with inflation hedge theory: an investment in gold should at minimum retain its 
purchasing power by responding to rising inflation through increased returns. 
Stated differently, as the general price level is increasing, or the purchasing power 
of the dollar is decreasing, gold will increase in value thus counteracting an 
investor’s loss in purchasing power. We expect gold prices to respond more to 
expected inflation rather than actual inflation, because it is the perception of 
future inflation risk that this hypothesis posits as the reason for fluctuations in the 
gold price. Our measure of expected inflation comes from the University of 
Michigan/Reuters Survey of Consumers. The survey reports the median price 
change expected over the next 12 months. A graph of expected inflation shows it 
to be somewhat sticky. When actual inflation is rising sharply as it did in the early 
1980s, people were expecting it to come back down. When it falls sharply as it 
did in 1987 and 1998, people were expecting it to rise back to a more normal 
level. 
If the price of gold responded to inflation alone, a graph of the real gold price 
would be a horizontal line. If gold prices responded to inflation among other 
things and a graph of the real gold price was an upward sloping line, we would 
assume its returns outpaced inflation as we would assume its returns trailed 
inflation if the line sloped downwards. A graph of nominal gold prices should 
slope upwards at or above the rate of inflation if gold were to be a hedge against 
inflation. All these examples are assuming the current United States environment 
of constant targeted inflation of two to three percent each year. 
For our Consumer Price Index monthly data, the beginning of a period is the 
first day of the previous month and the end of the period is the first day of the 
current month. Because the gold price data is from the last day of the previous 
month to the last day of the current month, we do not have to use lagged variables 
to capture effects of inflation on gold. 
 
4.1 Gold and Expected Inflation 
At the first sight, there seems to be a close relationship between the gold price 
and expected inflation. The two variables nearly mirror each other, through the 
11
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 peaks of the early 1980s, to the decline in 1986, to the troughs in 2000. However 
this relationship is very crude. Looking closer, we can see that in 1983 inflation is 
dropping dramatically, but the gold price is rising. There are also numerous 
instances such as 1986, 1988, and 1998-2004 where either expected inflation or 
the gold price are making large moves but the other remains quite stable or 
behaves in a way contrary to what inflation hedge theory would suggest. McCown 
and Zimmerman (2006) find the same result for monthly returns, however, they 
do find when annual frequency (but not quarterly frequency) is used higher 
inflation is associated with higher gold returns. Regressing monthly gold returns 
on the logarithm of expected inflation yields a coefficient of 3.98 with a p-value 
of .5833. The simple linear model rejects the inflation hedge hypothesis. 
 
4.2 Gold and Actual Inflation 
When actual inflation is used as the independent variable, the coefficients are 
much smaller and are even more statistically insignificant. A graph of expected 
and actual inflation gives some insight as to why this is true. Actual inflation is 
much more volatile than expected inflation. People do not wildly change their 
expectations of future inflation but instead look to see what has happened both in 
the recent past and further back historically to inform their expectations. As stated 
earlier, expected inflation is sticky. Actual inflation, on the other hand, fluctuates 
a lot even when it is in a downward or upward trend. From 1985 to 1992, 
expected inflation rises a little bit gradually while actual inflation rises sharply, 
plateaus for a year, rises sharply again, only before dropping dramatically in 
1992. These whiplashes are not as present in the expected inflation index and thus 
that model allows for a stronger relationship with gold returns. 
 
5. Gold and the U.S. dollar: the Dollar Destruction Hypothesis 
Connected to the idea of gold and inflation is the theory of gold responding to 
“dollar destruction.” Inflation can also be defined as increases in the money 
supply. As the money supply increases while productivity and output remain the 
same, prices increase. This has occurred on numerous occasions as bad 
governments print large amounts of money and eventually send their countries 
into hyperinflation. The somewhat analogous story, as purported by defenders of 
this theory is that when, by decreasing interest rates, or running a budget deficit, 
the Federal Reserve or the government decreases the value of the dollar. They 
believe the best defense to the loss of purchasing power that comes about from 
these government and government-like actions is to buy gold. This is distinct 
from the inflation hedge theory because it involves not only loss in purchasing 
power due to the general rise in prices, but also to a loss in purchasing power in a 
global environment due changes in exchange rates that are unfavorable to dollar 
holders. We look at the issue from two angles: first, we investigate the 
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 relationship between gold and real interest rates, and second, we investigate the 
relationship between gold and exchange rates. 
 
5.1 Gold and Real Interest Rates 
The real interest rate hypothesis suggests that as real interest rates in the 
United States increase, investors should sell their gold and buy treasuries. There 
are multiple rationales for this behavior. First, if the return to a risk-free asset, or 
any asset for that matter increases, the demand for that asset should also increase, 
thus decreasing the funds available for purchases of gold. Another rationale is 
related to the value of the dollar. As the U.S. real interest rate increases, the 
demand for the dollar should increase as investors from around the world should 
be purchasing dollars to take advantage of treasuries that now carry a higher 
return. As they purchase dollars the value of the dollar should increase, thus 
decreasing the relative value of gold. If an ounce of gold is worth $50 today, and 
tomorrow the dollar is worth twice as much as a result in a surge in demand, that 
same ounce of gold should only be worth $25. However, following the same 
analogy, future gold investors should now expect a higher yield from gold as the 
required rate of return has risen as a result of a rise in the real interest rate. Thus, 
when real interest rates rise, we would expect a decrease in the gold price and a 
later rise in the gold return. 
The real interest rate used here is the 10-Year Treasury bond rate minus the 
expected inflation number discussed earlier. The argument for using expected 
inflation here instead of actual inflation is similar to the earlier argument. 
According to the real interest rate hypothesis, the price of gold would be affected 
by future expectations of inflation, not old values. We can see in the early 1980s 
as gold performs two drops, the real interest rate has two peaks. From 1987 to 
around 2006, the relationship does not appear to be as strong but it still appears to 
be there. For our real interest rate monthly data, the beginning of a period is the 
first day of the previous month and the end of the period is the first day of the 
current month. Once again, because the gold price data is from the last day of the 
previous month to the last day of the current month, we do not have to use lagged 
variables to capture the relevant effect of the real interest rate on gold. 
Regressing monthly gold returns on real interest rates yields a coefficient of 
-3.31 with a t-statistic of -2.89 and an R-squared of .022. This means a one point 
rise in the real interest rate is associated with a $3 decrease in the price of gold 
over a month. This is economically insignificant as a one point rise in interest 
rates is huge. Regressing monthly gold returns on real interest rates for the current 
period, previous period, two periods past, and three periods past results in two 
significant coefficients: the contemporaneous coefficient is -9.85 with a t-statistic 
of -1.92. This is the same sign as before and is what we expect, a drop in gold 
prices (we can assume a fall in monthly gold return for the current period is the 
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 same as an immediate drop in gold prices). The coefficient for three periods 
(months) in the past is 16.919 with a t-statistic of 3.312. Thus, increases in the 
real interest rate in the past lead to increases in the monthly gold return. It is 
worth noting the R-squared value increases to .057 from .022 for this model with 
three independent variables. A one point rise in real interest rates this month 
corresponds to a decrease in gold prices this month of $9.85, and an increase in 
gold prices three months from now of $16.92. This is what we were expecting. 
Once the real interest rate rises, monthly gold returns should rise as investors are 
now demanding a higher rate of return since the return on risk-free assets has 
risen. 
 
5.2 Gold and the Dollar Exchange Rate 
Figure 6 shows the logarithm of the real gold price and the value of the dollar. 
To some degree it resembles the gold and real interest rate graph, only it is much 
smoother. Throughout the entire period (although less so from 1990 to 1997) the 
gold price and the dollar exhibit an inverse relationship. For example, from 1978 
to 1982, the dollar falls and gold rises, from 1982 to 1987, the dollar rises and 
gold falls. Peaks seem to match up very closely with troughs, and even smaller 
dollar movements such as those that occurred in 1982-1983 are matched inversely 
by gold price movements. This graphical analysis suggests gold has a very strong 
relationship with the value of the dollar. 
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 The simple linear regression confirms this. We used the difference in the 
dollar value from one month to the next as the independent variable. The 
coefficient is -7.4. It has a t-statistic of -4.71 and an R-squared of .057. A rise of 
one unit (because the index oscillates around a base value of 100 this is 
approximately a one percent rise) in the value of the dollar decreases the real price 
of gold by $7.40. Put it into the current price level of gold, which is about 800 
dollars per Trojan ounce, this amount is approximately one percent, which can be 
considered economically significant.  
A graph of real interest rates and the dollar shows the relationship discussed 
above. They move pretty well together with real interest rates being a slight lead. 
However, in 1997, the relationship breaks when the value of the dollar increases 
significantly. The cause of this decoupling of dollar value to real interest rates was 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997 after the Thai government could not defend the 
baht and maintain its peg to the dollar. As Asian currencies crashed, the relative 
value of the dollar increased thus resulting in the mountain top shown in the 
graph. As of about 2006, the real interest rate and dollar relationship seems to 
have been restored. 
 
5.3 Gold as a Currency  
To summarize, the dollar destruction hypothesis stands. Gold has unique 
features in comparison to other commodities. From its physical properties, gold is 
largely unproductive except in minor mechanical manufacturing and dentistry. 
One main demand of gold is in jewelry, which largely will be passed down from 
generation to generation. It is so durable to the point that gold mined each year 
adds (2,000 to 3,000 tons) very little to the existing stockpile (approximately 
150,000 tons). Furthermore, from the little gold demand data available (from the 
World Gold Council), gold demand, and no sector of gold demand (jewelry, 
investment & ETF, etc) appear to have any effect on gold prices. Preliminary 
research shows all coefficients to be statistically insignificant for the short sample 
period for which data is available, 2001-2008. 
Perhaps more important, gold has played a role as universal means of 
exchange through most of human history. Thus, it makes sense to think of gold as 
another currency. Along this line of thinking, gold value is simply relative to 
other currencies, and thus the gold price in real dollars should have an inverse 
relationship to the value of the dollar. Because high real interest rates increase the 
value of a currency, high interest rates should also in the shortest term have an 
inverse relationship with gold (and in the longer term increase gold monthly 
returns) and this is what we find. 
To further examine the idea of gold being more of a currency than a 
commodity, we regressed gold returns on the CRB index (differenced) and stored 
the residuals. We then regressed these residuals on the one-period lagged residual 
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 (to correct for serial correlation) and also the same factors mentioned earlier in the 
paper to see if the effects of interest rates, industrial production, inflation, and so 
on, were influencing commodities in general or were specific to gold prices. If 
coefficients showed up with significant relationships to the residuals, then we 
could conclude there is some component of gold price movement that cannot be 
captured by the general movement of commodities. The results are reported in 
Table 1 below. The first column of numbers shows the coefficients for many 
simple linear regressions, and the next column shows the coefficients for a single 
multiple linear regression. 
The coefficients do not mean much, but the significance for the multiple 
linear regression is close to our previous results. The dollar appears to have an 
effect on gold prices that is outside its effect on commodities in general. This 
would suggest gold is more of a currency than other commodities. In multiple 
linear models, consumer expectation is also significant. In our previous results, it 
was nearly significant, so this is not a real clash. The only real change is that real 
interest rates no longer show up as significant and the p-value of .34 is quite large. 
It is possible inflation expectations are taking away from some of this relationship 
as discussed before, or it may just be that real interest rates affects gold in the 
same way as they do other commodities. They are all assets after all which must 
earn some rate of return. 
The simple linear regressions in Table 1 all show up with statistically 
significant coefficients (with the exception of volatility), so there is not much to 
infer here other than individually, the relationship between these factors and gold 
prices is not fully accounted for in general commodity price movement. 
Table 1  Gold as a Currency 
 
Simple Linear 
Regressions 
Multiple Linear 
Regression 
Volatility .0004 - 
Consumer Expectations -.0503** -.03809* 
Bond Premium .0211** - 
Inflation Expectation .0126* .0030 
Real Interest Rate -.0025** .0011 
Dollar Value -.0064** .0059** 
S&P 500 - - 
Industrial Production -.0084** -.0044 
Cargo Freight Rate .0001 - 
Intercept - .1752 
R-square - .92 
No. of Observations 363 or 367 363 
The dependent variable is the residual of monthly gold returns regressed on the 
change in the CRB Index. **p-value < .05, *p-value < .1 
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 6. Multiple Linear Regression Models 
We now do several multiple linear regressions to see the ceteris paribus 
effects of the above-mentioned factors. Model 1 incorporates all the independent 
variables from the simple linear regressions earlier. The results are shown in 
Table 2. The coefficients of independent variables in Model 1 are similar to those 
in the simple linear regressions, showing the correlations between independent 
variables are not large. Model 3 is slightly more restrictive, limiting the regression 
to only the best fear indicator, inflation indicator, and market indicator as defined 
by highest significance from the simple linear regression. All of the independent 
variables from the dollar destruction section are included. The results once again 
remain unchanged except for slight changes in the magnitudes of the coefficients. 
None of these multiple linear regression models are particularly interesting 
however, prompted by McCown and Zimmerman’s (2006) finding that inflation is 
not a factor in the short term but in the long term, we applied our same models to 
annual frequency. The results shown in Table 2 are different. Table 2 also 
compares Model 2 for monthly and annual frequencies, along with Model 3 for 
monthly and annual frequencies. 
Previous research says inflation becomes significant over longer periods of 
time. To explain this, we can consider how we think about gold. When gold 
demand is broken down, only 15% is investment demand, the rest is jewelry 
consumption, industrial and dental11 . If we think about gold as a good or 
production input, rather than money, it is not far fetched to assume its price over 
time should rise along with the general rise in prices. The Consumer Price Index 
is derived the change in prices of a basket of goods, maybe computers, 
refrigerators, bread. If you throw gold into that list, it should rise along with 
everything else over longer frequencies. Nonetheless, in shorter time frames, the 
15% of gold demand that is investment is moving the price all over the place as it 
considers factors such as the value of the dollar and real interest rates. 
To explain the insignificance of expected inflation (which is counter-intuitive 
by earlier analysis), we need to think about inflation, real interest rates, and the 
value of the dollar together. As we have said earlier, they are intertwined. 
Regressing the difference in the dollar value on real interest rates yields a 
coefficient of 1.06 with a p-value of .0571 and an R-squared of .12. Regressing 
the difference in real interest rates from one period to the next on the logarithm on 
inflation yields a coefficient of 1.22 with a p-value of .008 and R-squared on .224.  
If inflation is perceived to be increasing, people can reasonably understand 
interest rates will rise. If real interest rates rise, it can be believed the value of the 
dollar will increase. Both increases in real interest rates and increases in the value 
of the dollar lead to drops in the gold price. Although a higher interest rate may 
                                                 
11
 More on http://www.research.gold.org/supply_demand/. 
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 lead to higher gold returns in the future, this multiple linear regression is 
contemporaneous and thus does not capture this effect. Instead, we probably get a 
lower coefficient on expected inflation due to people anticipating the effects such 
inflation will have on real interest rates and eventually the dollar. 
 
Table 2 Multiple Linear Regressions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Monthly Annual Monthly Annual Monthly Annual 
Volatility -0.01 .14 .00 .11 - - 
Consumer 
Expectation -.21 -.67 -.18 -.42 -.20 -.16 
Bond 
Premium  6.81 19.48 3.05 -.08 - - 
Inflation 
Expectation -2.58 -9.04 .50 .79 -.43 2.87 
Real 
Interest Rate -4.43** -6.92** --3.27** -3.21 -3.01** -2.52* 
Dollar 
Value -5.98** 0.00 -6.07** -.25 -6.21** -.45 
S&P 500 0.80 3.14 .71 4.58 - - 
Industrial 
Production .52 1.36 .64 .30 .26 .00 
Cargo 
Freight Rate -.19 -0.29 - - - - 
Intercept 30.52 68.20 25.97 39.48 27.59 18.68 
R-square 0.08 0.50 0.07 0.36 0.07 0.25 
No. of Obs 359 29 363 30 363 30 
The dependent variable is monthly/annual gold return. **p-value < .05, *p-value < .1 
 
 
7. A Semi-Structural VAR Model 
In the previous section, we showed very roughly the correlation between 
macroeconomic factors of interest. The above-mentioned multiple linear 
regression models are not proper for investigating the responses of gold price to 
changes in those macroeconomic aggregates and vice versa as there is consensus 
among economists that the price of gold is endogenous. Nevertheless, we are 
interested in which factors drove up the real price of gold and their relative 
contribution in different times of history. In order to do so, we perform impulse 
response functions, variance decomposition (VDC) and historical decomposition 
(HDC) of the real price of gold using a semi-structural vector auto-regression 
(VAR) model.  
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7.1. Methodology 
VAR allows us to examine the dynamics between variables in the models 
with the presence of movements of other variables. The power of a structural 
VAR is that it can give us mutually independent shocks (structural shocks) which 
enable us to track how the cumulative effect of one given shock alone on the price 
of gold. Also, we can identify the contribution of one shock in the price 
movement of gold at given points in history. We first estimate the reduced form 
VAR using the least squares method. Then, we orthogonalize the reduced-form 
errors in VAR using Cholesky decomposition to get the structural errors. By 
orthogonalization we actually assume a particular recursive relationship, which 
must be an economically sensible framework. We will defend the structure and 
assumptions of the model below. For the purpose of this study, we use a 
semi-structural VAR model because we cannot specify all the structural shocks 
under the recursive structure. For instance, it is impossible to set apart the 
influence of real exchange rate per se on real price of gold as we know the real 
exchange rate is endogenous, therefore, any thought of “exchange market shock” 
cannot be structural.  
Given the fitted structural VAR model, we can readily obtain the impulse 
responses of the return of gold to the specified structural shocks. Furthermore, we 
can compare the contributions of different structural shocks to variability of return 
of gold, as measured by the prediction mean squared error. It is meaningful to 
point out that this kind of forecasting variance decomposition (VDC) is 
retrospective conclusion; it can only depict the average of a certain sample period. 
Alternatively, based on impulse response functions, we could put ourselves into 
certain points in history and computer the cumulative influence of certain 
structural shocks on return of gold until that time. This is historical decomposition 
(VDC).  
 
7.2. A semi-structural VAR model 
My semi-structural VAR model consists of five monthly series: 
t( , , , , )ante r rgt t t t ty rea r e Pπ= , where trea is the dry cargo freight rate index 
mentioned earlier, tπ refers to U.S. inflation measured by percentage change of 
CPI from 12 months ago, antetr denotes the expected (ex ante) real long-term 
interest rate we discussed earlier, rte defers to the real exchange rate between U.S. 
dollar and a basket of major currencies, for which we use “Price-adjusted Trade 
Weighted Exchange Index” constructed by Federal Reserve Board, and lastly, 
rg
tP  is the real price of gold (logged). The sample period is January 1973 to 
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 December 2007. In estimating the model, I allow lags of up to two years (24 lags, 
as our data is monthly).  
 
7.3. Identifying Assumptions 
The reduced-form VAR is: 
24
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The structural VAR model is:  
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follows that we can use Cholesky decomposition to transform the 
variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form errors tε∑  into that of structural 
error tu∑ . Specifically, 
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We can name a few of the orthogonalized shocks, namely, 1tu , 
3
tu  and 
5
tu . 
1
tu , which is only related to the change of US industrial production, is referred to 
as the aggregate demand shock for industrial commodities (aggregate demand 
shock for short). As commonly postulated, the Federal Reserve bases their 
targeted interest rate on real economic activity and inflation. 3tu  is likely 
represents monetary policy shocks that affect the ex ante real long-term interest 
rate (10-year Treasury bond in this case). 5tu reflects innovations other than 
aggregate demand shocks, monetary policy shocks and some other unspecified 
shocks underlying inflation and exchange rate that can affect the real gold returns. 
Presumably it could contain many components. But as I will argue below, the 
behavior and timing of the estimated shocks were consistent with what the safe 
haven hypothesis would have predicted. So we name this to be “gold-specific 
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 demand shock”. By the above specification, we impose the following 
assumptions: 
First, we assume that fluctuations in real economic activity, for which the 
cargo freight rate index is a proxy, can affect inflation, exchange rate, ex ante real 
interest rate and the return of gold in the same month, but not vice versa. This is 
very reasonable as manufacturing production tends to behave sticky or sluggish. 
Second, we hypothesize that the monetary policy shock and the “residual” 
structural shock influencing the exchange rate and the gold-specific demand 
shock will not affect inflation, at least not in the same month. The empirical 
evidence for this is vague, so we believe that it is acceptable to add this 
assumption in constructing the model. 
Third, we impose the restriction that the gold-specific demand shock and the 
underlying but unspecified structural shock on exchange rate won’t affect the ex 
ante real interest rate at least in the same month. How the exchange rate and the 
Fed-monitored T-bond rate interact empirically is an intriguing issue. So this 
assumption is debatable, but nevertheless, one can hardly rule out this assumption 
as being one reasonable alternative. Also, we exclude the possibility that 
gold-specific demand shock can affect exchange rate of US dollar against major 
currencies, which is not a big matter to our topic.  
Lastly, we implicitly postulate that there is no gold supply shock in our model. 
The rationale for this is that gold is an extremely durable asset. The amount of 
newly-extracted gold each year is negligible comparing to the stock of gold 
worldwide, and therefore will hardly affect the price. But we fully understand that 
this assumption is somewhat presumptuous in the sense that the price of gold is 
determined mainly by the amount of gold on open market. The change in central 
bank gold reserves is potentially a huge influence on gold price. But to get an 
accurate measure and timing of these actions is not easy. There is little research 
looking into this field, we will try to take this factor into account in our future 
drafts of this paper.  
 
7.4 How Gold Returns Respond to the Specified Shocks  
Figure 6 plots the impulse responses of real price of gold to unit structural 
shocks. Figure 7 plots the cumulative impulse responses of real price of gold to 
unit structural shocks. (See on the next page) 
An unexpected aggregate demand expansion of industrial commodities, 
which often associates with global economic expansion, will cause gold returns to 
fluctuate in the first twenty months; mostly it will drag it downwards. After 
twenty months, the expansion will lift gold returns, but very modestly. From the 
cumulative graph, we can see an aggregate demand shock will lower gold returns. 
This pattern seems to verify the story of negative beta asset, which claims the 
movement of gold price is in the opposite direction to most other commodities. 
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 But notice the magnitude of the effect is not very noticeable, even in the starting 
months. Without the bootstrap confidence intervals, we cannot judge whether it 
contradicts the zero-beta asset conclusion stated earlier.  
 
Figure 6  Impulse Responses of Various Structural Shocks 
 
 
Figure 7  Cumulative Impulse Responses of Various Structural Shocks 
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 An unanticipated monetary expansion will have a similar effect on gold 
returns as the aggregate demand shock does: it will modestly disturb gold returns. 
The effect will diminish after about twenty months. Cumulatively, a positive 
monetary policy shock (loosening the money supply) will lower gold returns, 
which is consistent with the economic theory such as Capital Asset Pricing Model: 
the monetary expansion will lower the return of Treasury securities. In 
equilibrium, gold should also have lower returns, but in the short-term, there is an 
expected substitution effect, driving gold returns up and down. Again, the 
monetary policy shocks are of a very modest magnitude. 
The gold-specific demand shock will have an immediate significant positive 
effect on gold returns, but that effect diminishes very quickly, within two or three 
months. This resembles the sensitive and ever-changing sentiment in the financial 
market and its effect on gold returns. The historical decomposition will give 
additional evidence that this shock is likely to be the precautionary demand shock. 
 
7.5 Contribution of Each Shock to the Variability of Return of Gold 
As shown in Table 3, the variability of return of gold is overwhelmingly 
determined by the unspecified shock relating to exchange rate. In the first ten 
phases, that unspecified shock accounts for over 90% of the variation. The 
aggregate demand shock, monetary policy shock and gold-specific demand shock 
each contribute 3% or so. As forecasting steps increase, the aggregate demand 
shock plays a bigger role. If we use 200 as a proxy for infinity, 4
tu  still 
contributes over 62% of the variation. The share of the aggregate demand shock is 
nearly 21%, the monetary policy shock, 3.5%, the gold-specific demand shock, 
4%. This variance decomposition (VDC) table (Table 3) verifies the concurrent 
correlations we observed in the in simple linear regressions: the fear premium and 
aggregate demand can explain little of the movement of real gold price.  
Table 3 Variance Decomposition of the Real Gold Price 
Period 1
tu  2
tu  3
tu  4
tu  5
tu  
1 2.2618 0.1557 1.5417 95.5197 0.5211 
2 2.0475 0.069 3.8326 92.5343 1.5165 
3 1.2933 0.0563 5.4692 91.9857 1.1955 
4 1.0228 0.042 5.2007 92.6111 1.1234 
5 0.9499 0.0955 4.8305 92.8185 1.3055 
6 0.8465 0.0862 4.4274 92.8748 1.7652 
12 4.696 0.6195 3.0013 88.9245 2.7587 
50 20.0083 1.9262 2.6079 72.7334 2.7242 
100 19.9422 8.5212 3.1065 64.4125 4.0175 
200 20.91 9.2381 3.4905 62.2001 4.1613 
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7.6 The Cumulative Effect of the Specified Shocks on the Return of Gold 
Figure 8 is the historical decomposition of return of real gold. The figure 
shows that the specified structural shocks could not explain the average 
movement of real gold price at monthly level that well. There is some evidence 
that the spikes of real gold price in 1980 are only related to gold-specific demand 
shock, raising the possibility that the gold-specific demand shock is the “fear” 
precautionary demand shock. The spike in 1983 can be tracked to both 
gold-specific demand shock and aggregate demand shock. The downward 
trending real gold price in 1990s is mostly related to aggregate demand shocks 
among the three. And the recent boom in gold price since 2005 until the outbreak 
of the recent recession is related to both aggregate demand and gold-specific 
demand.  
 
Figure 8  Historical Decomposition of Return of Gold 
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 8. Conclusion 
This paper reexamines several commonly-held opinions about gold price 
movements. We consider safe haven, inflation hedge, and dollar destruction 
hypotheses. The safe haven hypothesis claims that gold returns will increase as 
fear increases. We use three alternative measures of fear: volatility in the S&P 
500 Index, the consumer expectation in Michigan Survey of Consumers and 
Moody’s Baa and Aaa bond premium. Gold returns do not have significant 
correlation with any of these measures. Related to safe haven hypothesis is the 
idea of gold being a negative-beta asset. We tested this hypothesis with S&P 500 
returns, U.S. Industrial Production and Kilian’s Dry Cargo Index and rejected it in 
favor of the zero-beta asset alternative. The inflation hedge hypothesis postulates 
the negative correlation between expected inflation and the return of gold. Our 
analysis disproves that hypothesis for shorter term frequencies. We find a very 
significant relationship between the price movement of gold, real interest rates 
and the exchange rate, suggesting a close relationship between gold and the value 
of U.S. dollar. The multiple linear regressions verify these findings.  
The decomposition of gold price under a semi-structural VAR model shows 
that aggregate demand shocks, monetary demand shocks, and precautionary 
demand shocks have only a modest influence on the price of gold. The 
unspecified structural shock underlying exchange rates is the driving force of the 
gold price.  
The central message of the paper is that gold’s relationships with fear and 
inflation are not what most people believe. We should not regard gold as a 
mysterious asset that is immune to fluctuations and behaves uniquely on the 
market. Rather, we should regard it as another currency, whose value is a 
reflection of the value of the U.S. dollar and U.S. monetary policy. 
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